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Collective action aims at the joint management of common pool resources. 
Agrobiodiversity at the community level is conceptualized as a collective resource 
requiring the management of varieties, species and their interrelations within a farming-
system. In the rice dominated agriculture in the uplands of Kerala, India, few community 
groups continue maintaining and thus conserving their high diversity in landraces. Faced 
with the challenges of devastating prices for rice, their traditional system of collective 
action to exchange seed material and knowledge is endangered. A new institutional 
mechanism to manage biodiversity is the People’s Biodiversity Register, a mandatory 
documentation procedure to enable cost and benefit sharing under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. The comparative analysis of these contrasting cases of an 
indigenous and an administered effort is concerned with the importance of the analytical 
category of gender for the rules structuring the actions of the groups. Gender is perceived 
as an institution, constructing regulations of access and conduct for its members, shaping 
the room to maneuver. Do the core elements constituting collective action, namely 
reputation, trust and reciprocity imply different consequences for men and women? Do 
the rules structuring group mobilization imply different consequences for men and 
women in the same given context and regarding the management of the same resource? 
Where do we observe differences and to which effect? Since action resources are very 
much determined by the existing construction of gender, the question is how does 
collective action enlarge or inhibit the choices of men and women. Based on 2005 
empirical data, the paper analyzes the tribal community of Kurichyas and the People’s  
 iii
Biodiversity Register with special emphasis on the analytical category of gender 
concerning the core elements trust, reciprocity and reputation of collective action 
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Collective Action in Plant Genetic Resources Management:  







Considering gender as an institution with different rules for women and men that 
shape their action resources, this paper focuses on the core elements that make collective 
action possible- namely reputation, trust and reciprocity- and assesses their differential 
implications for men and women. How does collective action to manage agrobiodiversity in 
two settings of complex biodiversity ecosystems influence gender as a social category? 
In Kerala, South India we observe a diminishing biodiversity in traditional rice 
varieties, endangering future breeding activities. Despite this overall erosion, genetic wealth is 
maintained by a few tribal communities in Kerala, who cultivate and utilize landraces despite 
much more lucrative options of conversion to banana or areca nut cultivation. The conversion 
of rice fields into less diverse cash crop plantations like bananas, areca nuts and ginger is 
driven by the drastic difference in market prices. At the same time this trend is accompanied 
by a deterioration of the soil quality and breakdown of the irrigation system. The cultivation 
of cash crops has ecological and social consequences that concern the whole farming system 
and affect the water holding capacity of the soil. Furthermore, the gendered division of labor 
                                                      







undergoes drastic changes, reducing women’s crucial involvement to insignificance. Women 
hold a key position in the conservation of traditional rice varieties through their high 
involvement in fieldwork and their knowledge in utilization. While the cash crops receive 
institutional support through subsidies and extension, the governance of the traditional rice 
varieties remains reduced to certain ethnic groups with a limited scope of coordination. With 
the decline in agrobiodiversity the status of women is likely to decrease with cash cropping, 
making women’s labor and knowledge redundant.  
The transformation of rice cultivation towards cash crop production disenfranchises 
women from traditional roles and collective action coping strategies. Similar trends can be 
observed in Asia (Agarwal 1985) and Africa, (Schroeder 1993, 1997). As Carney and Watts 
(1990) have shown in the case of The Gambia around the cultivation of groundnut, the 
politics of production in peasant societies, observable in the contest over gendered access to 
property rights, are injected into the household and are deeply engendered. Agarwal (1997) 
analyzed collective forest management and found that unlike the old systems of communal 
property management which recognized the usufruct rights of all villagers, the new 
institutions represent a more formalized system of rights based on membership. Under the 
new initiatives, membership is replacing citizenship as the defining criterion for establishing 
rights in the commons with implications for equity. Mosse (1997) critically questions 
`community management' approaches to common property resources, which run the danger of 
producing ahistorical and apolitical constructions of `locality', and impose a narrow definition 
of resources and economic interest.  
Reflecting on the gender dimensions of environmental collective action, Agarwal 





dependence on these networks and the commons in general, and their potentially greater 
homogeneity relative to men in the example of community forest groups. She outlines how 
neglecting gender as an analytical dimension can lead to a flawed assessment of the success of 
community institutions in terms of participation, distributional equity and efficiency. 
Consequently, this may cloak opportunities for forming and sustaining successful 
environmental management groups through women’s more substantial involvement.  
Women often play an active role in the protection and conservation efforts of natural 
resources, but their presence in management groups is often nominal. Collective actions often 
are ‘men’s groups’ with, at best marginal female presence. The question of voice has a critical 
bearing on the functioning of the groups and the distribution of costs and benefits. 
Participation in collective action groups can indirectly affect intrahousehold benefit sharing in 
so far as relative contributions affect perceptions about claims (Sen 1990), increasing the 
legitimacy of women who are seen to be involved. Women’s lack of participation also affects 
the efficiency of the collective effort; imperfect information flows hamper communication, 
leading to an inaccurate assessment of resource depletion and a resistance to rules 
enforcement. Non-involvement of women weakens the implementation of sanctions and 
undermines conflict resolution. The non-incorporation of women’s specific knowledge on 
species-varieties and their different preferences for plants can also be a significant factor for 
failure in collective resource management, relevant for the current case of biodiversity 
management at hand. 
Agarwal (2000) stresses gender differences affecting group formation in respect to 
relations of trust and reciprocity, moral norms and values as they play a central role in 





conservation stem from the gender division of economic resources and the division of labor. 
Property rights affect the extent of the dependence on common pool resources and the 
distribution of responsibilities affect the degree and character of the dependence. This double 
dependence on nature translates into a more conservationist attitude. With less involvement of 
women in collective action concerning natural resources, there can be a gap between the 
women’s interests and their ability to act on those interests. 
Often women’s collective action arises out of everyday cooperation and networking 
with the advantage of flexibility. However, it should be noted that the division of formality 
and informality along gender lines, with formality being linked with authority and informality 
divested of authority, systematically disadvantages women and reduces institutionalization. 
Women are prevalent in sporadic, situation and resource specific ‘agitational’ collective action 
(Agarwal 2000), but rarely find entry into regular decisionmaking forums of these 
movements. Agitational collective action can complement, but not substitute for, institutions 
that monitor natural resources, as we will see in the case of the ‘People’s Biodiversity 
Register’. Effective participation involves attending meetings, speaking out and having 
influence on decisionmaking. 
This comparative study of two types of collective action for the management of 
agrobiodiversity focuses on the norms of reputation, trust and reciprocity. The paper is 
structured as follows. It describes the social dilemma in biodiversity management, especially 
for the resource agrobiodiversity. It then introduces and discusses the analytical variables 
shaping collective action and the core relationships of reputation, trust and reciprocity. Next, 
the contrasting collective action cases of the agricultural tribe of the Kurichyas and the 





Finally, policy recommendations and conclusions are drawn for the future of collective action 
and its consequences for women in biodiversity management.  
THE SOCIAL DILEMMA IN AGROBIODIVERSITY 
MANAGEMENT 
Agrobiodiversity provides humanity all of its food and many medicines, industrial 
products and a wide range of goods and services, plus genetic material for agriculture, 
spiritual and socio-cultural practices. It plays a major role in the sustainability of agricultural 
production and in providing livelihood security for the poor. Among other agriculturalists, 
tribal men and women have not only conserved such genetic wealth, but have added value to 
them through selection and information. 
While the maintenance of high levels of agrobiodiversity serves as a “global life 
insurance” against risks in natural resource management, collective action could be perceived 
as a proactive precaution against the idiosyncrasies of individual human behavior. The focus 
of this paper is on the management of knowledge to solve the problem of information sharing 
on agrobiodiversity. Collective action aims at the solving of social dilemmas, where 
individuals have to choose actions in an interdependent situation. It this context, we could 
understand the social dilemma as a conflict between the individual rationality and optimal 
outcome for a group. Contrary to classical game theoretical situations, people in the natural 
world do not make decisions independently but rather engage in a discourse where they share 
or withhold information. Likewise they are confronted with different enforcement 
mechanisms by local institutions and larger government structures, which are in place to 





The resource agrobiodiversity  
Natural and semi-natural ecosystems (de Groot et al. 2002) can be organized 
according to their functions, goods and services into four different categories: 
•  Regulation functions: Maintenance of essential ecological processes and life support 
systems, such as water and climate regulation.  
•  Habitat function: Providing habitat for wild plants and animals as a nursery or 
refugium. 
•  Production function: Provision of natural resources for food, genetic resources and 
medicines. 
•  Information function: Providing opportunities for cognitive development in the form 
of landscapes, cultural features and spiritual values. 
 
The complexity of biodiversity and its subsequent challenge for investigation and 
recommendations rests on three dimensions describing veritable claims to biodiversity 
governance. Jungcurt et al. (2005) pointed to the multiple levels of human-nature interaction 
and the importance of recognizing the specific features of the plant resources at stake and the 
institutional environments of actors. First, biodiversity describes the biological components of 
a complex system of ecosystem functions. These functions are the basis for the delivery of 
ecosystem goods and services. Human interaction with ecological systems to appropriate 
these services occurs at different natural and human scales. Institutional analysis has to 
account for this complex web of interaction and must integrate several scales of social 





Second, human benefit from biodiversity covers a broad range of ecosystem goods and 
services that differ widely with respect to their properties as seed, food or an agroecosystem 
in the case of paddy. Public goods require different governance structures than private goods. 
Depending on the type of appropriation (the way it is used) physically identical units may 
serve as different goods or services with different properties. These variances in properties 
and the ways they affect transactions lead to the development of a plurality of governance 
structures affecting a specific component of biodiversity or a set of ecosystem functions. 
Furthermore, the behavior of actors not only depends on their direct relationships with the 
ecological system, but also on the broader institutional, social and cultural context. The 
context has a strong influence on the actor’s logic of action. Therefore specific governance 
structures will lead to different actor responses depending on the context and its impact on the 
logic of action.  
As Jungcurt et al. (2005) have noted, common pool resources are characterized by low 
feasibility of exclusion and high rivalry in consumption (e.g. common pasture) and are often 
managed through reciprocal relationships. The relevant attributes of some goods vary 
depending on the type and context of use. For example, seed materials are a form of genetic 
resources that is used as an intermediary product for food production. In the short term, seed 
has the character of a private good since it can be planted only once in a given vegetation 
period. In the long run, however, due to its self reproducing capacity, seed may be better 
characterized as a club or even a public good since with multiplication and thus larger 
amounts, its rivalry for consumption decreases with time and access to a small quantity may 
be sufficient to reproduce and use a specific variety (Smale et al. 2004). For users in the 





information. However, prior to its revelation through research activities this value is highly 
uncertain. As soon as it is decoded and its value identified it becomes an information resource 
that has the characteristics of pure public good (Janssen 1999, Swanson and Goeschl 2000). 
Institutions for biodiversity governance must thus include a variety of governance structures 
for transactions relating to goods and services with different properties even within a single 
plant.  
The cases to be analyzed and compared in this paper are concerned with seed and 
knowledge management. The transfer and exchange of both features of biodiversity – as seed 
and the related characteristics conveyed in the information – are at the core of this enquiry 
and of maintaining and conserving agrobiodiversity.  
ANALYTICAL APPROACH: VARIABLES SHAPING 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The institutional set up for knowledge management in local agrobiodiveristy is shaped 
by variables influencing collective action. The number of participants, the features of the 
resource at stake, the heterogeneity of actors, the prevailing communication patterns and the 
sequence of cost and benefits arising form involvement in the collective effort influence the 
performance. The core variables are reputation, trust and reciprocity, bringing individuals 
together to form a group to solve the social dilemma. Ostrom (2005a) has identified, through 
numerous empirical studies and deduction from various natural and social science theories, 
important variables shaping collective action. To analyze collective action as a means to solve 
social dilemmas, in this case to conserve and use agrobiodiversity, a number of variables have 





•  Number of participants  
The number of participants involved in the collective action is decisive for the types of 
mechanisms of control, monitoring and communication that are likely to be successful. It 
appears relevant to consider the number of actors involved in creating, transferring and 
sustaining the knowledge associated with intransparency caused by the secretive nature of the 
simple grain over its genetic potential. According to the number of knowledge holders and 
actors involved, motoring mechanisms have to be adjusted and sustained. 
•  The features of the resource and related transactions  
The features of transactions are determined by the physical attributes of the natural 
resource at stake and have a great influence on the shape of social and institutional 
arrangements. By their idiosyncratic properties like the genetic information, as a food item or 
in their ecological aspects of an agricultural plant, the resource itself shapes the forms of 
institutions and the options for collective action. For example, in agrobiodiversity we observe 
substractive and non-substractive consumption. While the non-substractive cultivation of 
certain crops may diminish other varieties by crowding out, the substractive consumption of a 
certain seed as food will help to maintain its conservation in the long run through the resulting 
demand.  
•  Heterogeneity of actors  
Differences in wealth, i.e. social, human, economic, environmental, and physical 
capital that can be translated into action resources, are indicators of heterogeneity among 
actors. In many cases, these differences can be captured by the variable of gender, although 
since this variable does not account for differences among women and men, respectively, the 





should also be considered. Nevertheless, the focus on gender is a key analytical category in 
this paper since we might expect greater cooperation among women due to lower 
divisiveness. Agarwal (2000) suggests less class and social divisiveness among women, even 
when households are differentiated, for three reasons: Women’s class position is much more 
precarious than men’s because it is linked to marriage, which can be dissolved by widowhood 
or divorce for all women. Women share significant communalities that cut across privilege 
and status such as housework and childcare and women are usually less connected than men 
to local power structures. This and the greater permeability of women’s networks could make 
for better prospects for collective action among women than among men in heterogeneous 
communities.  
While other sources of heterogeneity may also have an effect on collective action, as 
noted above, gender is likely to influence social interaction between persons and thus improve 
the quality and accuracy of an analysis of collective action. In particular, the variation in the 
gendered composition of the group may affect its performance; women may contribute more 
in all-female groups, whereas men may demonstrate more commitment in mixed-sex groups. 
Sell (1997) explains this discrepancy according to the actor’s expectations of the degree of 
influence they can achieve within a group.  
Other sources of differences between actors involved in collective action might have 
positive effects on its success. For example, while wealthy participants, irrespective of their 
gender, might generate trust and help to overcome motivation problems in the very beginning 
of group formation, an unequal distribution of benefits among participants immediately 






•  Communication patterns 
The possibility of face to face communication and the general character of information 
sharing and decisionmaking are likely to influence the coherence of the group because the 
direct response in a dialogue can work like moral suasion; i.e. when people become aware of 
the emotional impact of their actions on others.  
 
•  Sequence of costs and benefits 
 
The shape of the production function, be it decelerating or acclerating, which reads as 
the need for high initial costs in the very beginning of a collective effort or for investments in 
a later stage when benefits are already visible, influences the challenges to overcome the 
social dilemma of joining individuals in a collective effort. 
Core relationship of collective action: Longterm Interaction 
While the above mentioned variables significantly influence the institutional 
environment for collective action, the core of this cooperative effort grows out of long term 
relationships, since only these repeated interactions allow for a somewhat reliable estimation 
of the future actions of actors. The core relations of reputation, trust and reciprocity point to 
the human longing for predictability and security in relationships between people. Information 
about past actions of someone is a major reason for people to approach the other with positive 
expectations. A good reputation builds trust, a fundamental assessment for entering 
cooperation. While at face value a person may appear trustworthy, this assumption undergoes 
a monitoring process to either prove or reject a good reputation. The second core relationship 
trust, points to entry and exit mechanisms and the importance of withdrawing trust as a veto 





ties” (Granovetter 1973) changes situations of interconnected decisionmaking from that of the 
isolated prisoners dilemma to one of an assurance game.  
 
Reputation: Triangulation 
The first core relationships of collective action already points to the problem of uniting 
different actors towards one goal, but at the same time highlights the importance of these 
various people as potentials and sources for all kind of resources. Here we are concerned with 
information exchange to predict the likeliness of behavior in people. Reputation works 
basically as a triangulation of information in a comparative fashion over a third party. 
 
A          B over C 
 
Actor A communicates with actor B to assess qualities and probabilities of actor C. For 
example, actor B, who has a strong reputation for maintaining a high fertility of seed during 
storage, is likely to be in the position to rate actor C’s abilities on that particular capability. 
Actor B will either reinforce or devalue the inquiring actor A’s perception. This control system 
is only possible with repeated interaction. Thus, what could be denounced as gossip is 
actually a vital function of human interaction to increase security within relationships. This 
system of cross-checking and triangulation, an evaluation according to prevailing norms, is 
also a discourse on values, in which they are negotiated, shifted or maintained (Padmanabhan, 
forthcoming). A second important aspect of reputation is the question of evaluative criteria. 
Very often the conduct in relationships does form cornerstones in this assessment procedure. 
The relationships actor C maintains with actors A and B, and also with other actors, are key 





is closely linked to that of the others. Men and women mutually depend upon their spouses’ 
reputation to gain access to resources; in fact, reputation is an asset in itself to be guarded. 
  
Trust: Individual assessment 
The second core element of collective action, trust, builds on the general notion of 
reputation. Nevertheless, the situation is more specified and reduced to the individual 
assessment by actor A of actor B. This interpersonal trust is the thread that ties networks 
together and enables people to put aside differences in asset endowment to arrive at a 
collective action (Jones 2004).
2 Trust has been found to overcome heterogeneity; therefore it 
is important to consider when paying attention to gender relations, a significant social 
indicator of difference.  
A              B 
 
Trust is dynamic. Like agrobiodiversity, it grows with successful utilization. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be bound to institutional lifecycles (Jones 2004) associated with 
predictable dilemmas owing to the sequence of cost and benefit streams in collective action. 
In an early stage of collective action, the need for high investments might accrue. The early 
investment by wealthier people has proven to increase trust also in the less better off. If this 
initial bottleneck is overcome, the future process can build on increased trust. This trust 
appears as a pacifying factor, allowing for the creation of different roles within a collective 
action. The character of trust encompasses ratio and emotions. It is not only a decision based 
on rational assessment of an actor’s reputation and double checking via personal interaction, 
but also an emotional need and strategy to reduce the avalanche of (contradictory) information 
                                                      





to a definite feeling.  A basic human need is the urge for social security in the sense of 
belonging. Trust is necessary to relieve us from the constant weighing and counterweighing of 
pros and cons against a person or an action. This simplifies the decisionmaking processes of 
actor A and lays the foundation for long term interaction with actor B. 
Reciprocity: Interaction 
The third core element of collective action moves from assessment of past actions to 
the likeliness of a return of actions. Whereas reputation and trust entail a mix of moral and 
emotional judgments, reciprocity is concerned with the factual outcome of actor A if he 
engages in collective action with actor B. Moving beyond processing of information, we 
arrive at a situation where the interaction between actors, or the collective, and the outcome of 
this interaction is up for valuation. 
 
A                  B 
 
Reciprocity is the adequate response between actor A and B in reaction to a former 
event, where Actor B acted in favor of Actor A. The valuation of adequateness encompasses 
notions of likeliness, quality, timeline etc. of returns and is not neccessarily mirroring the first 
action, but  must appear as contextually sufficient as a major criterion to consider reciprocity 
as fullfilled. This is tied to the prevailing norms of reciprocal behavior that turn the positive or 
negative evaluation of a particular action into a “warm glow” effect of enhancing an actor’s 
reputation and trustworthiness versus the simple fulfillment of a mere “duty”, as Ostrom 
(2005) has pointed out. The norms and the experience of expectations kept combine to affect 
the orientation towards reciprocity in a way of positive self-fulfilling prophecy. These highly 





good. Nevertheless this requirement of fairness to make exchange a success embodies most 
often the double-sided rules of “equals should be treated equal and unequals unequal” 
(Ostrom 2005a). In light of gender relations, this rule implies a degree of variation (for 
example, in mere eligibility for returns) that has to be addressed carefully. A double standard 
of assessing work as eligible for payment results in lower wages or none at all for women. 
The prevailing norm and thus the legitimacy can have a significant impact on the success of 
collective action. Schroeder (1993) has shown that violating norms of fair reciprocity by 
increasing women’s unpaid workload undermines collective action. The norms guiding 
reciprocity are learned, and therefore differ and have to be shared. To reach a common 
understanding of the meaning of these rules, interaction provides the base for reciprocal 
behavior. Ostrom (2005a) highlights the need of exchange in opposition to supposedly 
independent acting individuals: 
“Humans learn norms, heuristics, and full analytical strategies from one another, from 
feedback from the world, and from their own capacity to engage in self-reflection and imagine 
a differently structured world.  They are capable of designing new tools – including 
institutions – that can change the structure of the worlds they face for good or evil purpose. 
Multiple models are consistent with a theory of bounded rational human behavior, including a 
model of complete rationality when paired with repetitive, highly competitive situations”.  
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN WAYANAD, KERALA 
The district of Wayanad in Kerala is a biodiversity hot spot in the Western Ghats. 





landscape diversity. The shift in cropping patterns from subsistence to mono cropping has led 
to fast erosion of crop diversity (Balaravi 2005). Paddy cultivation replacement by banana and 
ginger crops has posed serious threats to the typical wetland ecosystem in a district of high 
altitude (1400 m/NN) and heavy rainfalls (2300mm/y). It has irreversibly altered the habitat 
of the district because paddy fields act as small reservoirs and as percolation and aquifer 
recharge and are used to maintain the water table of wells even during summer. Water 
depletion and drainage occur when banana or areca nut palm plantation become permanent. 
The rice farming system of Wayanad can on the whole be described as a cultural heritage.  
In the following section, two contrasting cases of organizing such agrobiodiversity 
through collective action are presented. While some features of their structures and their 
involvement of men and women in the management of agrobiodiversity and related 
knowledge differ sharply, the cases share a common goal: joint efforts to contribute to the 
common resource of diversity within a wider agro ecosystem. The problem of coordinating 
individual efforts towards this larger aim is nevertheless pursued by different rules and 
mechanisms. In this analysis the focus is set on the core relationships, binding together actors 
in collective action to make the joint outcome more likely. Satisfying the demand of the core 
values is a precondition, as we will see, to make it happen in the long run. 
The contrasting cases 
Building upon previous research visits, the main data collection was carried out 
between April 2004 and September 2004. The qualitative data was collected with the 
assistance of an interpreter and facilitator. Since not much documentation was available then, 





expert interviews with key persons in involved NGOs and the relevant communities were 
carried out. With not much effort the five male experts could free themselves form other 
obligations and represent their official position in interviews. The same patterns appeared in 
the realm of focus group discussions in mixed and single-sex groups The interaction with 
groups in the Kurichya community took place within the large compounds of the joint family 
and was characterized by a constantly floating group size of between 9 and 15 persons and a 
dissolving of single-sex groups into mixed and vice versa. The four expert interviews with 
women subsequently turned into group discussions, when other women joined the 
conversation. In the case of the People’s Biodiversity Register, the office holders and 
members were visited in their homes and four men and three women could be interview in a 
more stable situation. A literature study supplemented the data base to arrive at the contrasting 
cases of the biodiversity management practices of an old tribal and a new government 
institution. 
Agricultural tribe: The Kurichyas 
Though the land under paddy cultivation in the district of Wayanad has decreased 
from 21,770 ha in 1990 to 8,725 ha in the year 2000 (Narayanan et al. 2004), the tribal people 
of the Kurichyas are still famous for their elaborate rice-farming systems and water 
management practice (Girigian 2003). The agrobiodiversity of rice is closely connected to the 
characteristics of land resources for paddy cultivation and integrated water management 
systems (Padmanabhan 2005). The Kurichyas are the first agricultural tribe from the plains of 
Malabar who colonized Wayanad (Pramod et al. 2003) before the Green Revolution. The 





central agrobiodiversity is represented by the varieties of paddy landraces. Market prices for 
rice have long been undercutting production costs, inducing (mostly illegal) shifts to other, 
more profitable crops. Despite this dynamic, the Kurichyas still cultivate paddy for their 
subsistence and not for the market. The production unit is the extended family which secures 
long term arrangements and a high frequency of transactions. The Kurichyas follow a rigid 
matrilineal system and land is held as a common property by the clan. They form the largest 
tribal community of Wayanad district and occupy the highest social status among tribes of 
Wayanad. Though the matrilineal tradition was legally abolished in Kerala with the 
Marumakkathayam Act in 1936, informal rules of descent along the female line continue to 
organize family groups. They live in large extended families of 50 people or more and 
cultivate a vast spectrum of crops, including different local traditional rice varieties, under the 
guidance of the eldest husband. The joint family lives in a single house with separate rooms 
for each woman, into which the respective husbands move in. The Kurichyas have a rich 
tradition of medicine and religion, and are also excellent agriculturalists (Pramod et al. 2003).  
Paddy rice forms their staple food and is regarded as the mother plant and plays an 
important role in purification and puberty rites. The Kurichyas conserve a large number of 
plants in their home gardens, especially those required for religious purposes, many of which 
are crop plants. Sacred groves conserve more than 100 different species and destruction is 
avoided through sacred taboos and beliefs. The Kurichyas cultivate paddy rice on the 
commonly held land under the guide of the pittan, or headman, to achieve food-security. The 
land is not divided into individual fields. Only seldom do women ask for a separate plot on 
the family holding to build a house for their nuclear family. The farming system aims at the 





neither mechanization nor outside labor is used. The Kurichyas believe that the application of 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides will negatively affect soil fertility. A clear cut gendered 
division of labor exists and most efforts and time consuming activities of transplanting and 
weeding are left to the women (Girigian 2003). Swaminathan (MSSRF/FAO 2000) 
summarizes the Kurichyas’ situation as one where the “…custodians of genetic wealth are 
increasingly confronted with severe economic problems that are rendering the maintenance of 
their traditional conservation ethics difficult.” 
Among the Kurichyas, the most senior husband has the right to sell, mortgage or lease 
property (Menon 1996), while the headman decides the crops to be planted in the common 
fields and insists on planting paddy for home consumption in order to provide food security 
(Anil Kumar et al. 2004). Beside the common fields, there are “private” fields for the spouses, 
which are held in the name of the wife and are cultivated according to the gendered division 
of labor between husband and wife. Banana plants used to be located only at the fringes of the 
irrigated fields close to the forest and do not interfere with the paddy fields. In a few joint 
households subplots have already been converted into banana plantations, following the 
general trend of other formerly paddy growing communities in Wayanad. Among Kurichyas, 
the possibly of converting the paddy fields into banana plantations has been discussed by the 
younger men, the next generation of decision makers. The joint family acts as an informal 
institution governing the use of family land. Within this joint family system the rights of the 
women are maintained by valuing collective food security more than individual short-term 
income strategies. The viability of the joint family as a multifunctional farming system with 
strong effects on equality among group members is questioned by the younger generation, 





possibilities of private cash crop production that would transform them into private property, 
leaving the women with no work, no food and no support network. However, the headman is 
still interested in keeping hands occupied and mouths fed, thus putting the goal of food 
security for all members above the economic gains for a limited number of family members.  
The tendency towards the nuclear family is accompanied by loss in biodiversity. As 
Hagedorn (2005) indicates the family farm system could serve as an integrating institution 
also for the reinforcement of jointness between commodities and non-commodities. Thus, 
strong incentives are needed to avoid future disintegration into private plots and nuclear 
hearthholds and to strengthen the joint family institution and its services for agrobiodiversity 
management. In order to understand the implications for gender equity, the strong plea in 
favor of an integrated perspective has to be accompanied by an analysis of the negotiations 
between women and men farmers. 
With the prominent role of livelihood issues for the Kurichyas, the need for collective 
action beyond one’s community has evolved. Institutional innovation is needed to engage all 
farmers in sustainable land use, sharing both costs and benefits. Within the Kurichya 
community, a tremendous social shift has been induced by the threatening conversion of 
paddy fields into banana plantations. Banana cultivation drastically changes the division of 
labor for women because while they play a prominent role in paddy cultivation, female 
workers are not involved in banana cultivation. Besides losing their work on the paddy fields, 
the possibility of accruing additional benefits from the rice fields, like catching crabs and fish, 
vanishes. When paddy fields are converted into banana plantations, working women are 
deprived of their jobs and their agricultural knowledge of local paddy varieties becomes 





security and to support their moral claims to surpluses. The change in crop and cultivation 
practices has long lasting effects on the status of women, now being deprived of direct 
contributions to survival as observed in other communities. 
People’s biodiversity registers 
“People’s Biodiversity Registers” (PBD) or “community” biodiversity registers, are a 
record of knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of people towards biodiversity, its use and 
conservation. A formal chronicling of a community’s knowledge serves two tangible 
purposes: (1) The documented knowledge is available for use in the public domain and; (2) It 
validates the use of traditional knowledge in the commercial domain” (AFPRO 2003). In 
many states, people’s or communities’ biodiversity registers at the panchayat level, the 
smallest administrative unit, have been promoted and pioneered mainly by NGOs working in 
the area of natural resource management and sustainable agriculture. The process of raising 
awareness, collecting knowledge and establishing documentation procedures at local 
panchayat, district and national levels aims at creating registers for biodiversity. These 
registers are attempts to fulfill the duties to comply with the Biological Diversity Act 2002 
and the Biological Diversity Rules 2004 of India. In signing the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) 1992, India recognizes the sovereign right of states to use their own 
biological resources. The convention stresses the contribution of local and indigenous 
communities to the conservation and sustainable utilization of biological resources through 
traditional knowledge, practices and innovations. It provides for equitable sharing of benefits 
with such people arising from the utilization of their knowledge, practices and innovations 





the Central Government, State Governments, institutions of local self-government, and 
industry. The convention concludes that “one of the major challenges before India lies in 
adopting an instrument which helps realize the objectives of equitable sharing” (National 
Biodiversity Authority 2004).  
Among the institutions of local self government to be developed and implemented to 
realize future access and benefit sharing, the People’s Biodiversity Registers play a key role. 
Although the National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) upon which the enforcement rests only 
became functional in April 2005, a lively discourse in the academic and development arena 
has critically accompanied different actors’ approaches to fulfilling the obligations of the 
CBD. One central effort at the local level has been close interaction with the custodians of 
genetic wealth. NGOs and academic organizations alike were involved in the consultation and 
crafting of the Biological Diversity Act2002 and the Biological Diversity Rules 2004. At the 
same time, efforts were undertaken to develop straight away new institutions and gain 
experiences with the practical application of Biodiversity Registers to secure local 
communities rights to the biodiversity they have been guarding and developing for centuries. 
In an attempt to prove the origin of certain plants and allow for the identification of specific 
keepers as a precondition for benefit sharing, local biodiversity registers have been 
established. No binding procedure has been fixed yet, and approaches vary as do terms.  
The Biological Diversity Rules 2004 specifies the constitution of Biodiversity 
Management Committees (BMC) for local bodies within its area of jurisdiction. In addition to 
stipulating committee size as a maximum of six persons under a chairperson, it fixes one third 
of the seats for women and not less than 18 percent for scheduled tribes. This means that at 





“The main function of the BMC is to prepare People’s Biodiversity Register in consultation 
with the local people. The Register shall contain comprehensive information on availability 
and knowledge of local biological resources, their medical or any use or any other traditional 
knowledge associated with them (National Biodiversity Authority 2004). The BMC further 
serves “[...] to maintain data about local vaids
3 and practitioners using the biological 
resources” and “maintain and validate the People’s Biodiversity Register. The Authority will 
take steps to specify the form of the People’s Biodiversity Registers and provide guidance and 
technical support. At the time of this research, the last three mandates of the NBA are still to 
be fulfilled. This highlights the situation of an evolving institution that this case study looks 
at. In this highly dynamic phase of taking formal rules to the field and turning them into 
operational rules, this investigation is only able to draw conclusions based on the limited set 
of observations in a fast moving institutional environment. 
The Wayanadan Agriculture and Rural Development Association (WARDA) is a 
pressure group consisting of elected members of local bodies, political leaders, government 
officials, farmers, NGO representatives and social workers. Its activities focus on policy 
advocacy at the local and regional levels, awareness, education, networking and capacity 
building. WARDA initiated the first attempts to engage in all the activities necessary for 
setting up and maintaining such a Biodiversity register. It has taken up the subject of 
legislation in biodiversity and plant varieties conservation as a focal theme for education and 
training and is networking with panchayath raj institutions (MSSRF 2005a). One attempt 
within this mission is to coordinate the documentation of traditional knowledge to give effect 
                                                      





to the provision in recent Indian legislation such as the Protection of Plant Varieties & 
Framers Rights Act 2001 and the Biological Diversity Act 2002.  
Setting examples for benefit sharing arrangements in close cooperation with the 
knowledge providing communities is imperative for conserving their dying traditional 
wisdom as well as the plants valued for their uses. This depends critically on the ability to link 
such knowledge to innovations of its uses. The steps to mobilize communities and individuals 
to register claims of knowledge, document ethno-medical expertise and build a database are 
current concerns (MSSRFb 2005). The aim of WARDA’s intervention is to enable tribal men 
and women to benefit from two Indian Acts, namely the Protection of Plant Varieties & 
Framers Rights Act 2001 and the Biological Diversity Act 2002 since they address newly 
constituted rights. Diverse crop varieties and medical plants are found in Kerala, however 
their documentation evolves into a major exercise as a given species may bear different 
vernacular names in different places. The challenge remains of how to utilize such kinds of 
contradictory or rather coincidental knowledge claims with the continuing consent of the 
knowledge holders. To establish a sound database, which will serve as the evidence for future 
claims in possible cost and benefit sharing endeavors, knowledge needs to be collected at 
district level or according to the ecological zone including details from seed collection, value 
addition and marketing. In preparing the registers at panchayat level, expert knowledge 
holders like local traditional healers, elderly men and women, herbal collectors, raw-drug 
dealers and ayurvedic doctors will be contacted.  
This new legislation form the Central Government meets a situation of policy 
devolution in the State of Kerala. The people’s plans (Veron 2001) are the main stake of local 





Committees fall under this jurisdiction of the devolved planning process and are heavily 
influenced by them, as we will see.  
FINDINGS: IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ON 
GENDER 
To give an overview of the circumstances under which the governance of biodiversity 
takes place, the central variables shaping collective action in the district of Wayanad in the 
cases of the traditional cultivators of Kurichya and the Peoples’ Biodiversity Registers are 
summarized (Table 1).  
Table 1—Variables shaping collective action 
 
  Traditional cultivators. Kurichyas  People’s Biodiversity Register 
Number of participants (core)  112 (2 x 56)  Ca. 120  
Features of transaction  Knowledge and seed  Knowledge and specimen 
Heterogeneity with focus on 
gender 
Traditional head of a hamlet pittan 
complemented by his wife 
Interaction facilitated by NGO 
bringing people together across 
gender, class and caste  
Communication pattern  Face to face 
Formal oral request 
Face to face 
One way documentation 
Sequence of cost and benefits  Steady stream of monitoring costs 
and exchange benefits 






The Kurichyas organize their collective action of seed management around the central 
figure of the pittan and his wife, implying that in each of the 56 hamlets at least two persons, 
one of each sex in complementary functions, will monitor and sanction the exchange of seeds 
and knowledge. The communication pattern of a face to face dialogue is central to the 
exercise of this procedure and follows strict sequences and formal, but oral, applications of 





interests. This continuous practice of monitoring, evaluation and possible sanctioning requires 
a constant effort of rule supervision, but at the same time grants a controlled flow of genetic 
material central to the survival of the rice farming system. The accumulated knowledge 
produces returns and contributes towards investments in knowledge management and 
transmission. 
The People’s Biodiversity Register is a collective endeavor in process. Centered 
around the initiating NGO and their facilators, who have been working in the district on 
biodiversity with tribals and women’s self-help groups processing local herbs into medicines 
for sale, the meetings throughout the year focused on the identification of specimen through 
transects, group discussions and expert interviews. The documentation and selection of 
samples for the register by a fluctuating group of people brought together men and women 
from different strata of the society. These carefully orchestrated meetings worked in sex-
segregated groups and strategically approached knowledge holders known to them from 
previous work to maintain a gender balance. These efforts were met with the investment of 
time by the participants to contribute towards a return in the far future. The collective 
movement culminated in an awareness rally, joined by 120 demonstrators marching to draw 
attention to the cause of the People’s Biodiversity Register. 
The findings on these two distinct institutional arrangements to maintain biodiversity 
are presented according to the core principle of collective action. Reputation, trust and 
reciprocity act as central analytical categories to dissect the group formation with special 
reference to gender. Accordingly, we will first consider the case of the traditional cultivators, 
the Kurichyas, where women’s comparative high status is endangered by the possibility of 





‘reputation’ reveals gendered channels of triangulating information on relationships, while 
trust requires gendered and generation- specific control and sanction mechanisms to maintain 
social cohesion and flow of seeds. Reciprocity encompasses strong norms of sharing for all 
Kurichyas, while the moment of choosing or rejecting modernity remains a men’s choice.  
The second case study on People’s Biodiversity Registers (PBR), evoked by the 
National Biodiversity Act 2004 and still in the implementation phase, points to the danger of a 
disembodiment of knowledge from its holders. Reputation is a core element for attracting 
local experts on biodiversity to the evolving institution, whereby the referential system might 
be shifted or even lost to outsiders. Trust enables long term collective action, but might imply 
different degrees of risk for men and women. Reciprocity in the PBR requires higher stakes 
from women for an insecure bet on the future. 
Traditional cultivators: endangered womens’s status 
The collective action of interest among the Kurichyas is the governed exchange of 
seeds and information. Every three years, a new variety needs to be planted in the fields 
because the old variety will drop in yields and be replaced by homegrown seeds with the side 
effect of degeneration of specific traits. In order to avoid this downward trend, new seed 
material will be sought after. Within their traditional varieties, the Kurichyas distinguish 
between three groups according to the characteristic of maturity. Those varieties with a long 
maturity will unfold their full potential within 10 months,  while medium maturity varieties 
range between six and seven months and short duration traditional landraces range between 
three and four months. Early or late maturity of the paddy plant is an important criterion for 





harvesting of a short-maturity one. Another important quality of seed material for the 
Kurichyas to have knowledge of is its suitability for specific soils, of which they entertain a 
highly differentiated system of categories taking into account soil texture, drainage capacity 
and nutritional status (Anil Kumar et al. 2004). 
Reputation: Gendered channels of triangulating relationships 
The pittan, the guardian of the paddy as seed, still prefers to cultivate the traditional 
varieties, because the high yielding varieties are less tolerant to ecological stress and require 
more fertilizer. The traditional varieties are preferred by the pittans because they provide more 
fodder for feeding the animals, which are important for traction and milk, and because they 
have a unique and appreciated taste. The pittans are very well aware of that fact and 
consciously decide to continue growing and thus maintaining these landraces. As a 
community, they shoulder the burden and the cost of conserving the traditional varieties. 
Pressed by the immense workload and the urge to literally feed themselves with the rice they 
grow, they have already anticipated a threshold for this private conservation policy: in case 
the coming modern varieties yield thrice as much, they will no longer be willing to realize 
these opportunity costs. Therefore, information on yield remains crucial. 
This information on specific properties and expected quantity is necessary to assess 
the quality of a crop as a seed for three groups of persons who are involved in seed exchange: 
Those are (1) the Kurichya household headed by the pittan representing an arthara of two to 
three households, (2) which sum up to a tharavar (hamlet), represented by the carnivar as the 
leader of a hamlet and (3) other non-Kurichya farmers, who are interested in obtaining seed 





households within tharavars or with an outsider. If a fellow Kurichya of another tharavar is 
interested in a particular variety, the exchange will be conducted on a 1:1 rate; for outsiders 
the exchange rate is 2:1. The outsider is supposed to provide double as much from his very 
own seed material to receive the desired landrace or family he favors. He is basically 
perceived as a guest, who places a request that cannot be easily denied. The object of 
exchange is the grain still in its husk to allow for safe treatment of the seed before storage. 
While the transfer of seed between the Kurichyas is a common affair, the extension of this 
system to outside communities occurs less often and is much more closely monitored to 
control seed material flow from outside. Nevertheless, the governance structure allows for this 
give and take and reinforces the norm of reciprocity, which is at the heart of Kurichya 
identity. Kurichyas perceive themselves as generous people, who are able to give away 
precious resources like seeds. This attitude brought them before colonialism into contact with 
Arab traders, interested in the wealth of spices grown in their gardens. Today, the asymmetric 
trade relations are assessed with more suspicion and a shift from a general attitude of sharing 
to more concern for individual property is observed. Before an exchange of seeds between 
tharavars occurs, a constant stream of information passes between the settlements. Since the 
Kurichyas are obliged to marry outside of their clans, many tharavars are connected by 
marriage. Between these hamlets, visits are conducted back and forth by men and women to 
keep in touch. In the case of special labor needs, working groups join the other tharavar. 
These interactions provide plenty of opportunities to exchange experiences and to observe 
varieties in the field and discuss them. If a variety in a field attracts a visitor’s attention, he or 
she will search for more information, either directly from people of the same sex involved in 





After having collected information informally, the carnivar, the leader of the particular 
hamlet, is to be contacted officially. He will not only be in a position to provide further 
information as a senior knowledge holder, but also he is the official contact with whom to 
place the request for a seed supply. The carnivar is the person whom is responsible for 
knowing about all affairs in the tharavars and therefore he controls the flow of seed material, 
a foundation on which Kurichiyas well-being has rested for the longest time. The carnivar 
will be approached before the harvest takes place only by male members of the household 
interested in the seed. Though men and women will have exchanged views and opinions on 
the material beforehand, the men-only meeting stresses the political character of seed 
exchange. Just as an exogamous marriage arrangement is mandatory for the future of the 
tribal community and its clans, the passing on of genetic material is crucial for stabilizing the 
cultivation practice –if it remains controlled and appraised. The carnivar will be asked about 
more particularities, yield and the availability. It is a precondition to arrange for a meeting in 
advance, so that time allows for cross checking of applicants and negotiation with the head of 
the household that grows the desired crop in the particular hamlet under the tharavar. After 
negotiations and inquires with the carnivar, the pittan of the arthara will invite the seed-
seeker as a guest during harvesting time. The requested amount of seeds will be earmarked for 
fulfilling the request.  
The pittan’s wife is also consulted in every kind of seed exchange. While the pittan 
handles official and outside contacts, the pittan’s wife acts as the guardian and custodian of 
women’s knowledge. Her central position in such rites as childbirth and puberty rituals 
marked by special rice dishes underlines her role as a guardian in rites of transition. She is 





next senior person to the pittan. The wife of the pittan is in charge of supervising the actual 
handling of the seed, and she will look after the storage of the seed. This begins with 
organizing the other women within the household to weave bamboo baskets to store the seeds. 
Her knowledge regarding herbs, which will be applied against post harvest pests, is central for 
fulfilling her role. The seed is stored separately according to variety and the containers are 
distributed in different corners. It is her responsibility to maintain and keep an overview on 
that system of risk diversification. This delicate expert knowledge is shared between the 
pittan, his wife and a second capable women in the house. They will handle the seed material 
for the house and also measure and clean the seeds for exchange. The weighing and quality 
selection for the guest’s demand is in their hands, as they are the ones who actually select the 
extra quantity of seed to enter the network of seed exchange. Although only men will 
approach a house for seed, they are well informed of the demands and supplies of others fields 
through informal channels of kinship and marriage. The women exchange information among 
themselves and share and transfer the knowledge, although they will not be allowed to 
directly approach the pittan for seeds.  
In considering the future of this seed exchange mechanism, estimates of its 
institutional effectiveness differ between the older and younger generations of women. The 
older women are optimistic and certain that the system will continue along with rice farming, 
since their cultivation secures a high quality of food with a unique taste that is also 
appreciated by outsiders, who offer premium prices. Younger women are more skeptical of 
their own role in this network and consider cropping decisions about whether to maintain 
traditional varieties as the domain of men. In economically difficult times, households had to 





banana at the expense of traditional rice has already improved their situation by keeping them 
free from debt for five years.  
Trust: Control and sanctions as gender and generation specific 
This system of controlled seed and knowledge exchange does not work in a sanction-
free environment. The Kurichyas have established a delicate structure of collective action for 
the coordination of plant genetic material that is intertwined with the wider institutional 
arrangements of the rice-farming system, encompassing a commonly held property in land 
along with a delicate water harvesting system. While the norm of sharing and generosity 
prevails among the hard-working Kurichiyas, the boundaries within which norm-conforming 
behavior grants support in every aspect of life by the group are clear cut. To protect the group 
and its values from disintegrating, different levels of sanctions are available. The most telling 
sanction in the case of a marriage alliance with a partner outside the Kurichya community is 
excommunication. Due to the unaccepted marital alliance and the subsequent loss of all social 
ties and access to the common property, the group withdraws it support and ceases to be 
generous. With this drastic step, the collective ranks its survival before the happiness of the 
individual, regardless the gender.  
In cases of property rights over land, we observe a range of reactions. While some 
households integrate the younger generation’s demand for cash by extending the area of cash 
crops like ginger and banana, other families hope to maintain coherence by giving out 
separate individual plots and allow for the building of separate nuclear family houses. In the 
case of breaking the laws of seed exchange, no drastic measures are taken, but the moral harm 





commons member who degrades the environment for immediate benefit will share the eventual loss in 
productivity, but the primary constraint on such behavior is the threat of lost status and reputation in the 
community. The private market participant, on the other hand, obtains status and reputation through the 
marketplace success and is constrained only by threat of punishment under the law” (Swaney 1990). The 
carnivar has to be aware of the seed movements within his mandate area to adhere to his 
responsibilities. If he is by-passed in the transaction, severe action will be taken. It is believed 
that illegitimately accessed seed, i.e. varieties exchanged without the knowledge of the pittan, 
are cursed with a bad omen and will not fetch a good yield.  
The carnivar in the matrilineal system of the Kurichyas will select his successor if he 
no longer feels capable of handing the various tasks of representing the community among the 
other tharavars and to visitors. He will select among the sons of his sisters. In the past, the 
representative and coordination responsibilities were smaller. The carnivars would visit one 
another among the pittans of the 56 Kurichya hamlets in the Wayanad district if a need arose. 
Today, the urge to improve their governance has resulted in the foundation of a coordination 
committee at the district level that comes together twice a year. Within their varmsham, the 
vicinity of three to four matrilineal connected hamlets, carnivars meet on a regular base to 
reach decisions on long term relationships. The most important ones are marriage alliances, 
which have to be considered according to clans, and relations to other castes. It is indicative 
of their less seriousness nature and their local significance that disputes over seeds and the 
violation of knowledge control will be dealt with at the lower atharvar level and not concern 
all 56 hamlets. The governance structure is devolved in this very aspect. A too tight 
governance structure might inhibit the desired flow of seeds. The fact that women have no 





concerning land use. Consequently they have only limited power to decide over the 
transformation from subsistence to cash crops. Thus a collective effort with discriminating 
rules. 
Reciprocity: Norms of sharing and choosing   
Kurichya farmers were anxious to know about the progress of the passing of the 
“Protection of Farmers Plant Varieties Act” in competition with the “Seed Act”. While the 
first recognizes the traditional farmer as the intellectual property rights holder of numerous 
landraces in compliance with the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), the later intends to grant 
more exclusive rights to breeders in accordance with the General Agreement on Trade and 
Trade related issues (GATT). The Kurichya farmers fear the disappearance of traditional rice 
varieties if their system of seed management is no longer in compliance with the law, and the 
law forbids the transfer of seed to others and forces them into seed purchase. 
Kurichya farmers use the very same system of seed exchange through which they are 
approached by outsiders for the medium and short maturity varieties, to access high yielding 
varieties. In the drier areas of Wayanad, where the ecological situation is harsher, families 
were forced to pledge their harvest on the still growing crop to traders in order to obtain cash 
to manage the lean season. These households exchanged their traditional varieties for high 
yielding varieties from their neighbors. To be able to cultivate this new acquisition they had to 
decide against a number of landraces and stop cultivating them on their land. 
As a joint strategy, the Kurichyas selectively adopted the fruits of the green revolution 
and maintain their right to reject the sway of progress; i.e. they made self-conscious, 





that determine production structure – are fundamentally decisions based on Wertrationalität 
(Weber 1947), meaning that they are rational decisions that are made to uphold or promote 
absolute religious values (Kraybill 1989). The Kurichyas decided how modern they want to 
be and try to regulate this via the Kurichya steering committee. The group leaves the 
individual with fewer choices, since the collective choice is to preserve the identity as 
Kurichya people. While collective action thus restricts individual choice, the realm of choices 
tends to be larger for men because instead of a blind conformity to tradition, Kurichya men 
decide which traditions are worthy of respect. 
Result: Women’s status linked to level of agrobiodiversity managed 
The shrinking demand of agrobiodiversity and especially rice varieties contributes to 
the diminishing of the social status of women, whose central labor input in sowing, 
transplanting, harvesting and processing in paddy cultivation secures them status. This 
influences the core relationships of collective action, namely reputation, trust and reciprocity. 
The social category of gender is a major organizing principle in collective action for seed 
management. It reinforces and strengthens the role of Kurichya people as long as women can 
fulfill their responsibilities. Collective action in agrobiodiversity management requires 
different responsibilities of men and women. The actual work varies to a significant extent, 
but is thus complementary, though this is subject to change with the conversion of the 
farming-system from paddy for subsistence to cash crops for the market.  
Kurichya men and women have divided roles and responsibilities. The work of the 
pittan’s wife in her managerial position of organizing the women for work to support the seed 





agrobiodiversity management knows two major arenas beyond the actual handling of seed and 
related information: the site of the field, where rice cultivation takes place and the kitchen, 
where rice consumption is prepared, are the places where the conservation and utilization of 
traditional rice varieties occur. 
The status of women in specific systems of plant cultivation, and the regard of their 
work and knowledge as well as the subsequent rooms of maneuver and access to other action 
resources suggests that their social position is linked to the level of plant genetic diversity the 
women are handling. The literature on the collecting of wild foods in the forests (Narayanan 
et al. 2004; Price 2003) stresses the enormous dependence of the tribal and gatherer 
communities on women’s ethno-botanical knowledge for well-being and survival. The 
intricate abilities to recognize, collect, and process edible plants throughout the year secures 
women a well respected status and considerable decision-making power. In communities 
whose major cultivation strategy is one of horticulture, where a large number of species and 
varieties are cultivated in a complex setting of mixed cropping and layering of horizontal 
spaces, women’s knowledge is required daily to utilize the interaction of plants in the 
confined area of a garden for consumption or marketing.  
The garden, especially the traditional homestead garden found in almost every 
household in Kerala, acts like a continuum between the wild and the cultivated by harboring 
plants that have been brought in from random collections. Therefore the diversity of species 
and varieties remains high and is correlated with a high esteem for the female managers and 
knowledge holders. The parallel of a high female to male sex ratio and the prevalence of 
gardens for daily supplies hints to this causal relation, though it has not yet been followed up 





dramatically and is concerned with a number of very specialized plants, which on a varieties 
level might show a high diversity again. With the reduction of necessary knowledge, the 
futility of complex interlinkages between cropping patterns and a sharp seasonality of the 
application of that knowledge, women’s virtuosity becomes less visible and less central to 
survival. Thus, the status of women in agriculture is endangered with sinking diversity. This 
appears as more pronounced when productions systems turn from complex natural resource 
management strategies into mono cropping following the goal of market access. Modernity 
does not automatically involve more rights for women and an increase in their status. In this 
case, we observe the opposite effect because women’s status is associated with their roles as 
preservers of biodiversity and when that biodiversity is challenged by younger generations of 
men those men do not accord women a high status. 
National Biodiversity Act: People’s biodiversity registers 
The collective interest of the People’s Biodiversity Register is the documentation of 
knowledge on biological heritage for the creation of awareness in the population and for the 
production of evidence for future cost and benefit sharing strategies. The recording and 
documentation fall under the responsibility of the locally elected political board, the 
panchayat. It is mandatory for the local government to install a PBR to fulfill its obligations 
towards the Act. Since it is a requirement by the Central government, but the rules and 
procedures have not yet become routine, we observe a likely beginning of collective action. 
This top-down procedure has to be filled with actors and interests to transform the formal 
governance structure into a cooperative action. Nevertheless the rather abstract political frame 





legislation triggered the panchayat to commission the local NGO to start working on the 
establishment of the register. Technical help and training were given to facilitators and 
enumerators for conducting interviews with local knowledge holders.  
Reputation: Shifting and losing the referential system to outsiders 
The work towards the People’s Biodiversity Register was a case of interaction 
between the NGO facilitators and the expert knowledge holders of tribal communities like the 
Paniya, the Kattunaikka, the Kuruma and others. The documentation work on the people’s 
biodiversity revealed the intimate relation between biodiversity, knowledge and its utilization 
(Narayanan et al. 2004). Much of the biodiversity found in gardens and in the wild have 
multiple uses and medical value. There are wide differences between the various tribal and 
non-tribal communities, and within the communities, regarding the knowledge of biodiversity. 
The utilization of the landscape varies between community groups. In respect to gender it 
became clear, especially among the knowledgeable tribal population, that women play a key 
role in the conservation and management of food species. They are taking effective steps for 
the sustainable management of various landscapes. Especially through the collection of wild 
food, they have gained immense knowledge of the multiple uses of wild plants. Processing 
knowledge –the key to turning biodiversity into a valuable food or medicine – is the strong 
hold of tribal women. In addition, women tend to know more than men about leafy greens and 
fruit trees.  
The high reputation women gain is associated with the importance of their knowledge 
in achieving food security. With declining availability of wild food, reduced utilization has 





knowledge, which used to have an immediate felt impact on women’s well-being, into a 
documented register is unlikely to result in the same status for women. The collective 
recognition of women’s contribution to survival contributed to tribal women’s freedom of 
movement and decisionmaking power. With a radical change in their audience from tribal 
community members to the bureaucrats and specialists appreciating and recording their 
knowledge, the collective no longer comprises the audience, where reputation is to be gained, 
and thus the mechanism of this core element of collective action is rendered dysfunctional. 
The shift to cash crops favors the employment of men to the disadvantage of women as does 
the shift to cash economy, where decisionmaking is tilted in favor of men, leaving women 
without their productive roles in paddy cultivation.  
Traditional knowledge is dynamic and fluid. It is constantly growing as evidenced by 
the knowledge gained by women within one generation about invasive alien species regarding 
their habitat, occurrence, food value, edible properties and methods of processing and 
conservation. At the same time the erosion of traditional knowledge continues, accentuated by 
changing attitudes and by the non-availability and non-utilization of several varieties.  
While some reputation might be gained in the long run by the interaction of tribal 
women with formal administrative structures, the reputation of the evolving governance 
structure, PBR, needs to be considered. The reputation of the institution is tied to the 
individual reputation of the facilitators. Since the PBR is an institutional innovation and no 
former experiences could be made with or heard about, the facilitators are taken as the 
governance structure they are representing. Former actions of the actors now in the role of 





she was associated with are essential to the success in the documentation procedure and the 
evaluation by the tribal community 
The continuous quality of interaction turns out to be the key evaluative criteria 
(Padmanabhan 2003) for tribal people to comply with the idea of a PBR, building upon a long 
lasting process of reputation gained. This reliable long term investment through development 
projects and communication is at the heart of fulfilling this core element of collective action. 
The foreseeable conduct in the interactions of the larger governance structure determines the 
viability of the PBR. This reliable interaction is the element tribal people have started to 
evaluate as an indicator for the reliability of the emerging governance structure. The 
facilitators might even assuage skepticism and fear of government-induced acts of control. 
Continuity and predictability as an evaluative criterion is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition to establish a working relationship with marginalized communities. Since the 
crafting of a new institution like the PBR per se is a venturing into unknown relationships, the 
linkage to already existing structures gains in importance. While the institutional set up of an 
NGO requires a cooperative and flexible working style to achieve voluntary cooperation, 
government organizations (GO) are per definition more stable, interpersonal and permanent. 
Since the installation of PBRs is at the heart a sovereign duty of the state in the form of its 
lowest political and administrative body, i.e. the panachayat through its Biodiversity 
Management Committee, the long term reputation of the PBR relies on the complementary 
advantage of the NGO and the GO sector in terms of social reputation and long term 
perspectives. Up to now, the heterogeneity of actors in this collective effort in terms of insider 
and outsider and the stress on women’s knowledge has been helpful, but whether it is 





Trust: Different risks implied for men and women 
It has been recognized during the collecting and documenting of the knowledge that 
great care and sensitivity toward the knowledge and the knowledge holders is necessary. The 
protection of the knowledge holders and recognition of them as custodians is necessary to 
avoid abuse and exploitative usage. The detailed documentation of sensitive biodiversity 
poses the challenge of ensuring and guarding indigenous rights. With the step to bring this 
local knowledge into the light and at the same time into the reach of other interested parties, 
the need for a system of safeguards, controls and possible sanctions becomes acute.  
We thus observe the importance of trust in different dimensions. The ultimate 
investment of trust was demonstrated by the trust the tribal people placed in the 
representatives of the NGO and the governance structure behind it, contributing towards its 
reputation. Here we observe the need to develop norms of sharing and control that will 
increase the trust in this institution. Previous contact reinforced the trustworthiness of the 
outsiders. Especially women, who shared their specialized knowledge, contributed with an 
extra effort to share their strategic information. With the disclosure and official 
documentation, they enter a system beyond their control. Be it for good or bad, for protection 
or exploitation, remains to be seen.  
For women, these developments bear further dimensions of social and political risk in 
comparison to men. The political domain and formal encounters even among tribal 
communities are a male duty and privilege. As we have also seen in the case of the Kurichyas’ 
seed management, the official representatives for outside contacts are the duty and privilege 
of men. The way women influence management decisions follows parallel, but less obvious 





Management Committee through reserved seats, they enter the public sphere. As the 
experience of women’s quota in the panchayat has shown (Reddy 2006) women’s 
participation is often reduced to merely their physical presence or women members are 
actually represented by their spouses. It remains to be seen, whether they can articulate their 
interests in this setting. By entering the public sphere, women violate notions of decency and 
appropriate behavior in a presumably democratic, but still socially hierarchical setting, which 
feeds back to their own reputation. The second dimension of risk women take in trusting the 
PBR with their practical knowledge of plants, their sites and usage is a social one regarding 
the revelation of associated tactics and strategies. As women influence decisions outside of 
the public sphere, they enjoy a comparative advantage they gain from their highly specialized 
knowledge, which is transmitted along gendered lines. With the documentation of it, 
involuntarily they reveal strategic options and hidden action resources. In sharing these 
patterns of biodiversity utilization to other heterogeneous groups of communities and men, 
they run the danger of losing strategic fall-back positions. Trust appears to be a double-sided 
coin for women, as their role as keepers of knowledge becomes less critical as their 
knowledge is documented. 
This trust and the consequent long term investments by the knowledge holders -as the 
initial providers of knowledge – and the consequent up-dating of the knowledge base is only 
one aspect that is important for the success of this institution to tackle the social dilemma of 
biodiversity erosion. Since the PBR is an enacting body of the Biodiversity Management 
Committee – established by the elected local government, the panchayat raj, it is at the same 
time very dependent on the local political situation. While the PBR is supposed to be 





political body, whose members will be selected by the current government. Here lies the 
major challenge to the continuation of a trusting relationship between indigenous people and 
people representing the formal governance structure. With every new election, the BMC will 
be on disposal. As long as the lively election campaigns, for which Keralites as politically 
aware and articulate people are known, are thriving, the PBR is defunct. The likely influence 
the current political climate will have on the long term project of documenting biodiversity 
cannot be foreseen. With ongoing local elections, PBR meetings came to a halt and went into 
hibernation. The “People’s Plan”, the local decisionmaking body for rural development, will 
decide which priorities to pursue, and thus resources will be set aside for establishing such a 
fragile new institutional structure. With this dependency on the current political climate, the 
investments of trust into the working relationship with the facilators and the training given for 
the documentation are endangered. Paradoxically, the collective effort, backed by a strong 
legislation from the central government, is questioned at its core by local participation in 
politics.  
Reciprocity: Higher stakes for women in the bet on the future 
The long term goal of providing evidence for possible access and benefit sharing deals 
in the future requires a strong investment of the knowledge holders at the beginning of this 
collective action. With the formalization of the documentation, it remains an open question 
whether the knowledge held by women will one day translate into benefits that reach the 
women. This remains a major problem, since bureaucracies tend to discriminate against 
women’ claims, especially in the case of women marginalized by caste, class or educational 





The methodology of collecting information on biodiversity knowledge and initiating a 
dialogue was developed by the local NGO and scientists working in the area of medical 
plants. Joint transects to identify relevant species while crossing an area were used to break 
the ice. Separate walks were undertaken with men and women of three different age groups: 
above 40; 15 to 40 and; below 15 years of age. In the tribal hamlet, a high diversity of plants 
in the home gardens was found, brought in by the inhabitants from their gathering tours for 
wild food in the forest and transplanted. What actually can be observed in this case of 
collective action is an intervention into an endangered system of knowledge application and 
transmission, to safeguard it for goals not intrinsic to the indigenous population at first glance.  
Result: Disembodiment of knowledge 
To what extent is gender an organizing principle in this case of collective action? 
Because this is a case of collective action at a very early stage, we can not yet predict how the 
PBRs will evolve, once the intervention of the facilitators has diminished. No working rules 
grant a continuous consideration of women’s knowledge and their claims. Rather, the 
ideology of equal access to participation in a register called “People’s” might hide the 
problems of marginalized tribal women confronted with a highly politicized biodiversity 
bureaucracy. Nevertheless, this collective action challenges the gendered social roles by 
coaxing women to come forward and share their knowledge with outsiders, which would be 
against the norms of traditional agrobiodiversity management practices.  
The PBRs are concerned with conservation of knowledge, not with seeds or plants. By 
documenting the knowledge in written form, the role of the knowledgeable person diminishes. 





knowledge gets disembodied and acquires a different, interpersonal quality. Whether this 
transformation of the knowledge serves the long term interests of the women in biodiversity 
management remains to be seen in such a young effort of collective action.  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The insights gained by the analysis of gender and collective biodiversity management 
vis-à-vis the core variables of collective action, namely reputation, trust and reciprocity, have 
implications for policy formulation. Three fields of action for further policy improvement in 
the context of local biodiversity resources can be identified. First, the need to secure local 
women’s intellectual property rights has to be recognized. Second, women’s property and 
access rights to assets, especially to land in the context of sustainability and poverty 
reduction, have to be considered. Third, the consequences in the political arena and for the 
existing devolved governance structure have to be drawn.  
Local intellectual property rights 
With the onset of a large scale effort to document existing knowledge on biodiversity, 
its utilization and sites in “Peoples Biodiversity Register” the question of control over this 
knowledge arises. With the transfer from the local expert to the local bureaucrat, the 
knowledge transforms from the oral to the written, from vernacular languages into Malayalam 
or English. Through this procedure, the local intellectual capital enters another sphere of 
knowledge management. Especially in the case of illiterate local experts, the knowledge 
moves beyond their control. While the initial idea was to construct evidence to prove the 





The “Peoples Biodiversity Register” requires clear working rules, procedures and control 
mechanisms on the ground to diminish the likeliness of this instrument being turned from a 
key to conservation into a thief’s picklock. 
The formal registration of plants by interviewing local experts has another far reaching 
effect. The particularities of the person giving testimony on the wealth of biodiversity are 
recorded to ensure the possibility for claiming benefits in the far future. The entering of a list 
of potential beneficiaries rather than the actual conservation of the plant is the concern. The 
identity of the person is no longer as significant as the tacit knowledge becomes redundant. 
This disembodiment of knowledge results in another different, interpersonal quality with the 
consequence of degendering and decontextualising living knowledge traditions. This 
transformation of knowledge appears as a threat to the long term interests of the women in 
biodiversity management. The idiosyncratic ways of women organizing, transmitting and 
keeping the tacit knowledge alive by application need institutional support matching their 
existing collective efforts, so that they can maintain identity. 
Property rights to land 
The case studies of the Kurichyas and the PBR highlight the relevance of women’s 
property rights. Since women’s status is linked in both incidents to high levels of diversity, 
this has implications for policies regarding access to land. Within the jointly held land in the 
Kurichya households, women have usufruct rights and enjoy benefit streams through 
subsistence production. With the trend to a separation of single, individual plots the question 
of property rights arises. With the cash crop production already alienating women from work 





Apart from the fields, the homestead garden is the prominent site for conservation of 
biodiversity. The possibility of legal rights to these home gardens directly in the name of the 
woman and not mediated by a male relative could secure continuity in knowledge and 
practice. With women’s greater dependence on biodiversity for status and income streams, 
their interest in sustainable management would be supported institutionally. 
Political economy and governance structure 
The decentralization and devolving of responsibility for development planning to the 
local level in Kerala has implications for the evolving governance structure for biodiversity. 
Since the PBR is the executive outcome of the elected Community Biodiversity Committee, it 
is prone to influences by the current political agenda. While the conservation of biodiversity 
and its documentation in PBRs is an ongoing long term process, the governance structure 
makes it vulnerable to shifts within short notice of the political will of the local constituency. 
Consequently, the National legislation, which paved the way for treating biodiversity in a 
collective approach, is highly dependent on the local currents of political interests. As 
women’s participation in the official political arena sometimes has only token status, so their 
options for intervention are limited. A clear and independent reporting mechanism to higher 
levels must be in place to challenge the primacy of local short term interests.  
With the installation of PBRs, the development of the political economy of 
biodiversity bureaucracy sets in. At the very beginning and supported by NGOs, stakes and 
positions are distributed and working rules get established. Depending on the continuity of 
transfers for the maintenance of this biodiversity administration, a dynamic of budget 





How long the interests of women knowledge holders will be regarded and treated accordingly 
in this power field remains to be seen. Although the ideology of decentralization with a strong 
emphasis on participation suggests equal access to services, the installation of an ombudsman 
may reduce the problems of representation for marginalized tribal women confronted with a 
highly politicized biodiversity bureaucracy. 
CONCLUSIONS: GENDER AND CORE 
RELATIONSHIPS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The People’s Biodiversity Registers are a first step to improve the position of 
indigenous biodiversity experts and conservers by backing their claim and manufacturing an 
instrument of evidence. Since every facilitating organization promotes different modes of 
documentations and the procedures are not yet finally approved, the direction of this 
collective action remains to be seen. The high initial costs and the unclear future of eventual 
returns and benefits, as well as the distribution of them, throw a skeptical light on long term 
success. Especially for marginalized tribal women, the identity of the knowledge holder might 
become redundant, since the knowledge is fixed and available. This separation, as well as the 
lack of conservation efforts of the actual plants and seeds, continues to present an institutional 
challenge. Both the preservation of plants and a sense of ownership need to evolve, but they 
also need to be upgraded in their ability to negotiate with the environment beyond the 
collective action. The core elements of reputation, trust and reciprocity are indispensable 
building blocks and assets to maintain group identity as an action resource. 
In the case of Kurichya traditional farming, women enjoy a high status because of 





demand of agrobiodiversity, especially of rice varieties, contributes to women’s diminishing 
social status. These exogenous factors on the action arena for collective action will influence 
the core relationships of reputation, trust and reciprocity.  
The case of People’s Biodiversity Registers is a very young institutional arrangement 
as compared to the elaborate rules of the Kurichyas. Giving this circumstance, the conclusion 
drawn has to keep in mind the short period available for trial and error and thus learning 
processes allowing for change and improvement. Nevertheless, the status of women within 
this new institution appears endangered and dependent on massive intervention by well 
meaning third parties, vulnerable to abortive political processes. 
In both cases, collective action plays a major role to govern the common pool resource 
biodiversity, especially knowledge-related properties. While the gate keeping of the Kurichyas 
is able to control, but not restrict, the viable flow of genetic material, the institutional set up is 
not positioned to recover the costs of their maintenance. Since this has not been the goal for a 
long time, the price competition endangers the sustainability of the whole landrace farming 
system. The institution for knowledge management, with its complementary task for men and 
women farmers, requires institutional innovations to deal with the threat of shrinking social 
coherence and thus, the vanishing support for the costly maintenance of an elaborate cultural 
heritage, the rice farming system in Wayanad.   
Further empirical research is required to evaluate the future development of collective 
efforts to manage biodiversity. In the face of a governance structure in the making, 
investigation into new coping strategies and pockets of resistance to disenfranchisement by 
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